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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Jeffrey Wiest brought an action under the 
whistleblower protection provisions set forth in Section 806 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, and 
under Pennsylvania law against Appellees Tyco Electronics 
Corporation and several officers and directors of Tyco 
Electronics (collectively, “Tyco”).  The District Court granted 
Tyco‟s Motion to Dismiss the federal whistleblower claims, 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state 
law claims, and denied Wiest‟s Motion for Reconsideration.  
Concluding that the District Court erred in requiring that 
Wiest allege that his communications to his supervisors 
“definitively and specifically relate to” an existing violation 
of a particular anti-fraud law, as opposed to expressing a 
reasonable belief that corporate managers are taking actions 
that could run afoul of a particular anti-fraud law, we will 
reverse, in part, the dismissal of the federal whistleblower 
claims and vacate the dismissal of the state law claim. 
I. 
A. Background 
According to the Complaint, Wiest worked for 
approximately thirty-one years in Tyco‟s accounting 
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department until his termination in April 2010.  For Wiest‟s 
last ten years of employment, his office was under “a high 
level of audit scrutiny” due to the well-known corporate 
scandal involving its former parent company, Tyco 
International, and its CEO, Dennis Kozlowski.  (App. 42, ¶ 
31.)  Around 2007, Wiest “established a pattern of rejecting 
and questioning expenses” that failed to satisfy accounting 
standards or securities and tax laws.  (Id. at 43, ¶ 33.) 
1. The Atlantis Resort Event 
In mid-2008, Wiest refused to process a payment and 
sent an email to his supervisor regarding an event that Tyco 
intended to hold at the Atlantis Resort in the Bahamas, which 
was similar to a corporate party under Kozlowski‟s 
management that had drawn significant criticism.  Expenses 
for the $350,000 Atlantis event included “Mermaid Greeters” 
and “Costumed Pirates/Wenches” at a cost of $3,000; a 
“Tattoo Artist (includes tattoos)” and “Limbo” and “Fire” at a 
cost of $2,350; chair decorations at a cost of $2,500; and hotel 
room rentals ranging from $475 to $1,000 per night.  (Id. at 
45, ¶ 41.)  In an email to his supervisor, Wiest expressed his 
belief that the costs were inappropriately charged entirely as 
advertising expenses.  He asserted that the costs needed to be 
detailed and charged as income to attending employees 
because the employees were bringing guests, and the 
expenses needed to “be reviewed for potential disallowance 
by a taxing authority based on excessive/extravagant spend 
[sic] levels.”  (Id. at 84, Ex. E.)  Following Wiest‟s email, 
Tyco‟s management determined that the five-day event 
included only a single one-and-one-half hour business 
meeting.  As a result, they determined that processing the 
payment “would have resulted in a misstatement of 
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accounting records and a fraudulent tax deduction,” and that 
Tyco needed to treat the event as income for attending 
employees.  (Id. at 43-44, ¶ 35.)  Tyco decided to proceed 
with the event and to compensate the attendees for the 
additional tax liability by increasing (i.e., “grossing-up”) their 
bonuses. 
2. The Venetian Resort Event 
 Also in mid-2008, Wiest received a request to process 
a payment of $218,000 for a conference at the Venetian 
Resort in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The request lacked both 
sufficient documentation for tax purposes and proper 
approval pursuant to Tyco‟s “delegation of authority.”  
Additionally, the request included inaccurate accounting and 
tax treatment information.  At Wiest‟s direction, one of his 
subordinates sent an email to the Tyco employee who 
submitted the request, explaining that the accounts payable 
department could not process the request until it had received 
an agenda and business purpose for the event, correct 
accounting treatment for various expenses, and approval 
pursuant to Tyco‟s delegation of authority.  The tax 
department eventually concluded that the conference served a 
business purpose, and the accounts payable department 
subsequently allowed the payment. 
3. The Wintergreen Resort Event 
 In late 2008, Wiest was presented with a request for 
approval of a conference at the Wintergreen Resort in 
Virginia in the amount of $335,000.  Like the Venetian 
Resort request, the Wintergreen expense request lacked both 
sufficient documentation and proper approval from Tyco‟s 
CEO.  Wiest emailed his supervisor, explaining that he 
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believed Tyco‟s internal policies required that the CEO be 
notified about the transaction.  To the best of Wiest‟s 
knowledge, Tyco processed the payment without the CEO‟s 
approval, in violation of Tyco‟s internal policies. 
4. Other Matters 
Wiest also alleges that he questioned other events 
between 2007 and 2009.  In particular, he questioned 
expenses for a “relatively lavish „holiday party,‟” a $52,000 
audit team meeting, and an employee baby shower.  (Id. at 49, 
¶ 55.)  He also sent an email to management when he 
received an expense request from an employee that included 
duplicate entries, additional nights of hotel bills, and 
undocumented expenses.  He informed management that 
processing that improper expense request would constitute 
invalid or undocumented business expenses if Tyco was not 
reimbursed or if the amount was not reported as income on 
the employee‟s W-2 form. 
5. Termination of Employment 
 Wiest alleges that Tyco became frustrated with his 
persistence in following proper accounting procedures.  In 
September 2009, two human resources employees met with 
Wiest and informed him that he was under investigation for 
incorrectly reporting the receipt of two basketball game 
tickets in August 2009, for having a relationship with a co-
worker ten years earlier, and for allegedly making sexually-
oriented comments to co-workers.  After Wiest learned of the 
investigation, his health declined and he went on medical 
leave.  Seven months later, Tyco terminated his employment. 
B. Procedural History 
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 On July 7, 2010, Wiest sued the Tyco Defendants, 
asserting that his discharge was in retaliation for his reports of 
improper expenditures, in violation of Section 806 of SOX.  
That section prohibits certain employers from discriminating 
against employees for reporting information that they 
reasonably believe constitutes a violation of one of several 
enumerated provisions relating to fraud and securities 
regulations.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
1
  Wiest also presented 
state law claims, including intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and wrongful termination, and his wife brought a 
claim for loss of consortium.  Tyco moved to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that Wiest 
failed to state a prima facie claim under Section 806. 
As to the threshold question for a prima facie case in a 
retaliation case under Section 806 – whether the Complaint 
sufficiently alleges that the plaintiff had engaged in 
“protected activity,” see 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e)(2)(i) – the 
District Court determined that Wiest had to allege that his 
communications (a) “definitively and specifically” related to 
a statute or rule listed in Section 806; (b) expressed “„an 
objectively reasonable belief that the company intentionally 
misrepresented or omitted certain facts to investors, which 
were material and which risked loss;‟” and (c) “reflect[ed] a 
reasonable belief of an existing violation.”  Wiest v. Lynch, 
Civil Action No. 10-3288, 2011 WL 2923860, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
July 21, 2011) (citations omitted).  In concluding that a 
                                              
1
 The enumerated provisions are mail fraud, wire 
fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, “any rule or regulation of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of 




communication must “definitively and specifically” relate to a 
violation of a statute or rule listed in Section 806, the District 
Court relied upon the decision of the U.S. Department of 
Labor Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) in Platone v. 
FLYI, Inc., ARB 04-154, 2006 WL 3246910, at *8 (Dep‟t of 
Labor Sept. 29, 2006), aff’d 548 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2008), and 
court decisions that endorsed Platone‟s “definitive and 
specific” standard.  Finding that the allegations of the 
Complaint failed to satisfy this standard, the District Court 
did not reach the other elements of a prima facie Section 806 
case, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
state law claims, and dismissed the Complaint without 
prejudice. 
The District Court‟s Order dismissing the Complaint 
granted Wiest leave to file an amended complaint.  Rather 
than filing an amended complaint, Wiest, on August 10, 2011, 
presented a motion entitled “Motion for Reconsideration 
Nunc Pro Tunc By the Eastern District Court En Banc of 
Judge Pratter Memorandum Opinion of July 21, 2011, Or, In 
the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs‟ Complaint with 
Prejudice and Enter a Final Appealable Order and Judgment” 
(“Motion for Reconsideration”).  In his Motion for 
Reconsideration, Wiest raised for the first time the argument 
that the ARB overruled Platone‟s “definitive and specific” 
standard in favor of a “reasonable belief” standard in 
Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC, ARB 07-123, 2011 WL 
2165854, at *11 (Dep‟t of Labor May 25, 2011) (en banc).  
Wiest argued that he was entitled to reconsideration because 
Sylvester was an intervening change in controlling law, and 
that the District Court‟s reliance on the ARB‟s prior Platone 
decision was a clear error of law. 
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 The District Court disagreed, reasoning that Sylvester 
was not an intervening decision because, although the ARB 
issued Sylvester after the parties completed briefing on 
Tyco‟s Motion to Dismiss, the opinion preceded the District 
Court‟s ruling.  Additionally, the District Court determined 
that Sylvester was not controlling precedent, and that even if 
it was binding, reconsideration was not warranted because (1) 
its initial decision relied on cases other than Platone, and (2) 
Sylvester‟s alteration of the standard for demonstrating 
protected activity did not change its conclusion that Wiest 
failed to establish that he communicated an objectively 
reasonable belief that Tyco‟s conduct violated any statute or 
rule listed in Section 806. 
 Wiest filed a notice of appeal on November 23, 2011, 
to appeal the District Court‟s Order denying his Motion for 
Reconsideration.  Wiest did not expressly indicate whether he 
also was appealing the District Court‟s initial Order 
dismissing the Complaint. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
A. Procedural Issues 
 Before turning to the merits, we must address three 
procedural issues.  First, Tyco argues that, because Wiest 
filed his Motion for Reconsideration twenty days after the 
District Court entered its dismissal Order, the Motion was 
untimely under E.D. Pa. L.R. 7.1(g), which establishes a 
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fourteen day period to file motions for reconsideration.
2
  As a 
result, Tyco asserts that we lack jurisdiction over Wiest‟s 
appeal from the District Court‟s denial of reconsideration.   
We see no jurisdictional bar due to Wiest‟s failure to 
move for reconsideration within the time constraints 
established by a local rule of court.  We have recognized that, 
in the context of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) 
motion to alter or amend a judgment, the prescribed time 
limits are claims-processing rules, rather than jurisdictional 
rules.  Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 276-77 (3d Cir. 
2010).  If the time limit contained within Rule 59(e) is not 
jurisdictional, we cannot see how the time limit contained 
within Local Rule 7.1(g) is jurisdictional.  In any event, we 
need not address the consequences of an untimely motion for 
reconsideration under a local rule because we construe 
Wiest‟s motion as one under Rule 59(e).  See, e.g., Fed. 
Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 
1986) (“For purposes of Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, we view a motion characterized only as 
a motion for reconsideration as the functional equivalent of a 
Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Green v. Drug 
Enforcement Admin., 606 F.3d 1296, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(noting the prevalence of courts construing motions for 
reconsideration as Rule 59(e) motions); Auto Servs. Co. v. 
KPMG, LLP, 537 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A „motion 
for reconsideration‟ is not described in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, but such a motion is typically construed as 
                                              
2
 The District Court noted that the Motion for 
Reconsideration was untimely under Local Rule 7.1(g), but 
nonetheless decided the motion on the merits. 
11 
 
either a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment or 
as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment.”).  Because 
Wiest filed his Motion for Reconsideration within Rule 
59(e)‟s twenty-eight day time limit, we conclude that the 
motion was timely. 
Tyco also argues that the scope of our review is 
limited to the District Court‟s November 2011 Order denying 
reconsideration because Wiest did not designate for appeal 
the District Court‟s July 2011 Order granting Tyco‟s Motion 
to Dismiss.  When a party appeals only a specified judgment, 
we acquire jurisdiction to review only that judgment or a 
judgment “„fairly inferred‟” by the notice of appeal.  Sulima 
v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 
1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977)).  Yet, we have also held that we 
“liberally construe[] notices of appeal.”  Id. (internal 
quotations marks omitted).  We may exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over orders not specified in the notice of appeal 
where: “(1) there is a connection between the specified and 
unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal the unspecified 
order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is not prejudiced 
and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Here, there is an adequate connection between the 
District Court‟s Order denying reconsideration and its 
underlying Order granting Tyco‟s Motion to Dismiss because 
Wiest requested the District Court to reconsider the legal 
standard it applied to his Section 806 claims in the original 
dismissal Order.  Second, because the two Orders of the 
District Court were intertwined, we infer that Wiest intended 
to appeal the underlying dismissal Order.  Wiest‟s intention 
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was apparent in his principal brief, in which he argues that the 
District Court erred in granting Tyco‟s Motion to Dismiss 
because it relied on the Platone standard rather than Sylvester 
and cites the District Court‟s dismissal Order throughout the 
brief.  Third, we find no prejudice to Tyco in reviewing the 
underlying dismissal Order as Tyco has had a full opportunity 
to brief the corresponding issues.
3
  As a result, we exercise 
jurisdiction over both the District Court‟s November 2011 
Order denying Wiest‟s Motion for Reconsideration and its 
July 2011 Order granting Tyco‟s Motion to Dismiss. 
Finally, we also reject Tyco‟s third procedural 
argument that Wiest waived any arguments based on 
Sylvester because he failed to raise those arguments in his 
brief in opposition to Tyco‟s Motion to Dismiss.  Although 
the District Court noted that Wiest first brought Sylvester to 
its attention in his Motion for Reconsideration and that a 
motion for reconsideration should not raise new arguments 
that the party could have made previously, the District Court 
proceeded to address Sylvester in its reconsideration ruling.  
The District Court evidently did not deem Wiest to have 
waived any arguments based on Sylvester, and neither do we. 
B. Standard of Review 
We have held that “a proper Rule 59(e) motion . . . 
must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change 
                                              
3
 In addition, we have also held more plainly that “[a] 
timely appeal from a denial of a Rule 59 motion to alter or 
amend „brings up the underlying judgment for review.‟”  Fed. 
Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 
1986) (quoting Quality Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J. 
Keating Co., 675 F.2d 77, 78 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
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in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) 
the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest 
injustice.”  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 
F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)).  We generally review a 
district court‟s denial of reconsideration for abuse of 
discretion.  Max’s Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 
673 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing N. River Ins., 52 F.3d at 1203).  An 
“errant conclusion of law, an improper application of law to 
fact, or a clearly erroneous finding of fact” may result in an 
abuse of discretion.  McDowell v. Phila. Housing Auth., 423 
F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2005).  More specifically, when a 
district court predicates its denial of reconsideration on an 
issue of law, our review is plenary, and when it bases its 
denial on an issue of fact, we review for clear error.  Id.   
In addition, we review a district court‟s dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.  Phillips v. Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  In Long v. 
Atlantic City Police Department, 670 F.3d 436 (3d Cir. 2012), 
we concluded that the standards of review for an underlying 
dismissal order and for the denial of a motion for 
reconsideration of the dismissal order are functionally 
equivalent, because we exercise plenary review of the 
dismissal order as well as of the legal questions in the denial 
of reconsideration.  Id. at 446 & n.20, 447.  Because the issue 
here is whether the District Court applied the correct legal 
standard to a claim under Section 806 of SOX, our review is 
plenary regardless of whether we review the District Court‟s 
application of the standard in its initial dismissal Order or its 
subsequent Order denying reconsideration.   
C.  Whistleblower Claims Under Section 806 of SOX 
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SOX Section 806 prohibits publicly traded companies 
and their employees from retaliating against an employee 
who 
provide[s] information, cause[s] 
information to be provided, or 
otherwise assist[s] in an 
investigation regarding any 
conduct which the employee 
reasonably believes constitutes a 
violation of section 1341[mail 
fraud], 1343 [wire, radio, or 
television fraud], 1344 [bank 
fraud], or 1348 [securities and 
commodities fraud], any rule or 
regulation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, or any 
provision of Federal law relating 
to fraud against shareholders, 
when the information is provided 
to or the investigation is 
conducted by . . . a person with 
supervisory authority over the 
employee (or such other person 
working for the employer who has 
the authority to investigate, 
discover, or terminate 
misconduct) . . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1514A.  To establish a prima facie case for a 
Section 806 claim, the employee must allege that he or she 
(1) “engaged in a protected activity;” (2) “[t]he respondent 
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knew or suspected that the employee engaged in the protected 
activity;” (3) “[t]he employee suffered an adverse action;” 
and (4) “[t]he circumstances were sufficient to raise the 
inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor 
in the adverse action.”  29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e)(2)(i)-(iv). 
Section 806 provides that an employee alleging 
discrimination in violation of SOX may file a complaint with 
the Secretary of Labor, who may issue a final order.  18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A), (2) (incorporating the Department 
of Labor complaint procedures under 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)).  
If the Secretary fails to issue a final decision within 180 days 
of the filing of the complaint, the complainant may also file a 
civil action in federal district court.  Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B).  
The Secretary of Labor has delegated the authority to review 
appeals under Section 806 and issue final agency decisions to 
the ARB.  Delegation of Authority and Assignment of 
Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 3924, 3924-25 (Jan. 25, 2010). 
 Focusing on the “protected activity” prong in its 
Memorandum accompanying its Order granting Tyco‟s 
Motion to Dismiss, the District Court invoked the ARB‟s 
opinion in Platone and concluded that “[f]or a 
communication to be protected, it must „definitively and 
specifically‟ relate to one of the statutes or rules listed in” 
Section 806.  Wiest, 2011 WL 2923860, at *4.  The Court of 
Appeals cases cited by the District Court in support of its 
application of the “definitive and specific” standard either 
relied upon or cited with approval Platone‟s standard.  See 
Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 996-97 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (deferring to Platone‟s “definitive and specific” 
standard as a reasonable interpretation of the statute); Day v. 
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Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting the 
Fourth Circuit‟s opinion affirming the ARB‟s decision in 
Platone in which the court employed the “definitive and 
specific” standard); Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 
468, 476-77 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We agree with the ARB‟s legal 
conclusion that an employee‟s complaint must „definitively 
and specifically relate‟ to one of the six enumerated 
categories found in” Section 806). 
 In Sylvester, however, the ARB abandoned the 
“definitive and specific” standard announced in Platone.  
Sylvester, 2011 WL 2165854, at *15.  The ARB noted that 
the test adopted in Platone originated in cases under the 
whistleblower provision in the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 5851 (“ERA”).  Id. at *14.  The ARB explained that, 
in addition to enumerating specific activities for which 
employers cannot retaliate against employees, the 
whistleblower provision of the ERA contains a catch-all 
provision to protect employees who “assist or participate in „a 
proceeding ... or any other action [designed] to carry out the 
purposes of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended.”  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1)(F)).  
According to the ARB, because the ERA does not define “any 
other action to carry out the purposes of this chapter,” courts 
interpreted that phrase to require that an employee‟s activity 
definitively and specifically implicate safety because of the 
ERA‟s purpose of protecting employee actions involving 
nuclear safety.  Id. 
As the ARB recognized in Sylvester, the SOX 
whistleblower provision does not contain language similar to 
the ERA‟s catch-all provision.  Id.  Instead, it expressly 
enumerates the laws and rules to which it applies.  Therefore, 
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the ARB concluded that the importation of the definitive and 
specific standard is “inapposite to the question of what 
constitutes protected activity under SOX‟s whistleblower 
protection provision.”  Id.  Moreover, the ARB determined 
that the definitive and specific standard potentially conflicts 
with the statutory language of Section 806, which prohibits 
retaliation against employees for reporting information that he 
or she reasonably believes violates SOX.  Id.
4
 
                                              
4
 In decisions issued subsequent to Sylvester, the ARB 
has asserted that the definitely and specifically standard does 
in fact conflict with the language of Section 806.  See Zinn v. 
Am. Commercial Lines, Inc., ARB No. 10-029, 2012 WL 
1102507, at *4 n.33 (Dep‟t of Labor March 28, 2012) (“[T]he 
„definitive and specific‟ standard employed in prior ARB 
cases is inconsistent with the statutory language of Section 
806.”); Prioleau v. Sikorski Aircraft Corp., ARB No. 10-060, 
2011 WL 6122422, at *6 n.3 (Dep‟t of Labor Nov. 9, 2011) 
(“In Sylvester, we made clear that the “definitive and 
specific” standard that the ARB had employed in prior ARB 
cases . . . was inconsistent with Section 806‟s statutory 
language.”); Reamer v. Ford Motor Co., ARB No. 09-053, 
2011 WL 3307575, at *3 n.3 (noting that the ARB “has 
criticized the use of „definitively and specifically‟ as a 
standard for an employee‟s reasonable belief of a violation of 
the laws listed under Section 806.”); Inman v. Fannie Mae, 
ARB No. 08-060, 2011 WL 2614298, at *6 (Dep‟t of Labor 
June 28, 2011) (finding error in the ALJ‟s use of the 
“definitive and specific” standard because it is inconsistent 
with the statutory language of Section 806); Mara v. Sempra 
Energy Trading, LLC, ARB No. 10-051, 2011 WL 2614345, 
at *7 (Dep‟t of Labor June 28, 2011) (same). 
18 
 
SOX does not define what constitutes a “reasonable 
belief.”  The ARB interprets the phrase to require that the 
plaintiff have a subjective belief that the employer‟s conduct 
violates a provision listed within Section 806 and that the 
belief is objectively reasonable.  Id. at *11-12.  Indeed, as the 
ARB noted in Sylvester, the legislative history of Section 806 
provides that Congress intended this reasonable belief 
standard to “impose the normal reasonable person standard 
used and interpreted in a wide variety of legal contexts (See 
generally, Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. U.S. 
Department of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478 [3d Cir. 1993]).”  Id. 
at *11 (quoting S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 19 (2002)). 
The ARB opined that to meet the subjective element, 
the plaintiff must actually have believed that the conduct in 
question violated the laws enumerated in SOX.  Id.  The ARB 
explained that “the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley 
makes clear that its protections were „intended to include all 
good faith and reasonable reporting of fraud, and there should 
be no presumption that reporting is otherwise.‟”  Id. 
(alteration omitted) (quoting Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 
577 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. 
S7418-01, (daily ed. July 26, 2002))).  Regarding the 
objective element, the ARB clarified that the plaintiff‟s belief 
“is evaluated based on the knowledge available to a 
reasonable person in the same factual circumstances with the 
same training and experience as the aggrieved employee.”  Id. 
at *12 (quoting Harp v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 588 F.3d 
722, 723 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
We conclude that the ARB‟s rejection of Platone‟s 
“definitive and specific” standard is entitled to Chevron 
deference.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
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Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (“If . . . the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue . . . the question for the court is whether the 
agency‟s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”).  As previously discussed, Section 806 provides that 
an employee seeking whistleblower protection under SOX 
may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who may 
issue a final order.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A).  The 
Secretary of Labor has delegated the authority to review 
appeals under Section 806 and issue final agency decisions to 
the ARB.  Delegation of Authority and Assignment of 
Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 3924, 3924-25 (Jan. 25, 2010).  In United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Supreme Court recognized 
that “express congressional authorizations to engage in the 
process of . . . adjudication that produces . . . rulings for 
which deference is claimed,” is “a very good indicator of 
delegation meriting Chevron treatment . . . .”  Id. at 229.  The 
Court further explained that “[i]t is fair to assume generally 
that Congress contemplates administrative action with the 
effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal 
administrative procedure,” including formal adjudication.  Id. 
at 230 & n.12.  Applying Mead, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the ARB‟s interpretation of Section 806 warranted Chevron 
deference based on this statutory and administrative 
delegation.  Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 276 & n.2 (9th Cir. 
2008).  We agree and hold that the ARB‟s interpretation of 
the “reasonable belief” standard is entitled to Chevron 
deference. 
 The fact that the ARB reconsidered and abandoned the 
“definitive and specific” standard does not preclude our 
deference to the reasonable belief standard it subsequently 
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announced in Sylvester.  In National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 
U.S. 967 (2005), the Court explained that “[a]gency 
inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the 
agency‟s interpretation under the Chevron framework.”  Id. at 
981.  The Court elaborated that “if the agency adequately 
explains the reasons for a reversal of policy, change is not 
invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the 
discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the 
implementing agency.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Here, the ARB thoroughly explained why it 
reversed the course it previously set in Platone.  See 
Sylvester, 2011 WL 2165854, at *14-15.  Therefore, Chevron 
deference applies. 
 While agreeing that the definitive and specific standard 
should be jettisoned, amicus curiae National Whistleblower 
Center (“NWC”) contends that the objective belief standard 
established in Sylvester is too stringent.  NWC argues that 
Section 806 protects an employee as long as he or she has a 
good faith belief in the existence of a violation.  For support, 
NWC relies on our decision in Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners v. U.S. Department of Labor, 992 F.2d 474 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
In Passaic Valley, we interpreted the whistleblower 
provision of the Clean Water Act, which protects employees 
who have “filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted 
any proceeding under” the Clean Water Act.  Id. at 478 
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).  At issue was whether the term 
“proceeding” included internal complaints.  Id. at 475.  We 
noted that, if the whistleblower provision was to accomplish 
the goals of the statute, then “employees must be free from 
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threats to their job security in retaliation for their good faith 
assertions of corporate violations of the statute.”  Id. at 478.  
Affording Chevron deference to the Secretary‟s 
interpretation, we upheld his construction that “all good faith 
intracorporate allegations are fully protected from retaliation 
under” the Clean Water Act‟s whistleblower provision.  Id. at 
480. 
Because the legislative history of Section 806 
references Passaic Valley in stating Congress‟s intention “to 
impose the normal reasonable person standard used and 
interpreted in a wide variety of legal contexts,” S. Rep. No. 
107-146, at 19 (2002), NWC contends that Congress intended 
to adopt Passaic Valley‟s good faith belief test as the only 
standard to meet in bringing a claim under Section 806.  We 
disagree.  First, at issue in Passaic Valley was the meaning of 
the term “proceeding,” Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d at 478, not 
the phrase “reasonably believes.”  As a result, its standard 
does not control the issue at hand.  Second, a good faith belief 
goes to the employee‟s subjective belief that a violation 
occurred, which is only one element of the reasonable belief 
standard applicable to Section 806.  Therefore, whatever 
guidance Passaic Valley provides, it relates only to the 
subjective element of a reasonable belief test.  As explained 
in Sylvester, the reasonable belief standard also includes an 
objective element.  Sylvester, 2011 WL 2165854, at *11.  As 
we did in Passaic Valley, and as explained above, we defer to 
the administering agency‟s reasonable interpretation of the 
statute.  As a result, an employee must establish not only a 
subjective, good faith belief that his or her employer violated 
a provision listed in SOX, but also that his or her belief was 
objectively reasonable.  Id. at *11.  A belief is objectively 
reasonable when a reasonable person with the same training 
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and experience as the employee would believe that the 
conduct implicated in the employee‟s communication could 
rise to the level of a violation of one of the enumerated 
provisions in Section 806.  Id. at *11-12. 
The Dissent contends that we have adopted an 
internally inconsistent test by recognizing that an employee 
must have an objectively reasonable belief of a violation of 
one of the listed federal laws but not a reasonable belief that 
each element of a listed anti-fraud law is satisfied.  We 
perceive no inconsistency because we do not think Congress 
intended such a formalistic approach to the question of 
whether an employee has engaged in “protected activity.”  As 
so aptly stated by our dissenting colleague, the purpose of 
“[w]histleblower statutes like SOX § 806 [is] to protect 
people who have the courage to stand against institutional 
pressures and say plainly, „what you are doing here is wrong‟ 
. . . in the particular way identified in the statue at issue.”  
(Dissenting Op. Typescript at 1.)  By identifying conduct that 
falls within the ample bounds of the anti-fraud laws, an 
employee has done just that.  That employee should not be 
unprotected from reprisal because she did not have access to 
information sufficient to form an objectively  reasonable 
belief that there was an intent to defraud or the information 
communicated to her supervisor was material to a 
shareholder‟s investment decision.  “Congress chose statutory 
language which ensures that „an employee‟s reasonable but 
mistaken belief that an employer engaged in conduct that 
constitutes a violation of one of the six enumerated categories 
[set forth in § 806] is protected.‟”  Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 
1001 (quoting  Allen, 514 F.3d at 477).  An employee‟s lack 
of knowledge of certain facts that pertain to an element of one 
of the anti-fraud laws would be relevant to, but not dispositive 
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of, whether the employee did have an objectively reasonable 
belief that a listed anti-fraud law had been violated.  Indeed, 
whether an employee has an objectively reasonable belief 
may not always be decided as a matter of law.  See Allen, 514 
F.3d at 477-78.  Indeed, this issue would generally not be 
amenable to adjudication on the basis of the averments of a 
complaint that concerns a communication that relates in an 
understandable way to one of the anti-fraud provisions listed 
in § 806. 
 In addition to rejecting the definitive and specific 
standard that the District Court relied upon in granting Tyco‟s 
Motion to Dismiss, Sylvester conflicts with two additional 
legal conclusions reached by the District Court relating to 
protected activity under Section 806.  First, in dismissing 
Wiest‟s Complaint, the District Court concluded that an 
“employee‟s communication must convey that his concern 
with any alleged misconduct is linked to „an objectively 
reasonable belief that the company intentionally 
misrepresented or omitted certain facts to investors, which 
were material and which risked loss.‟”  Wiest, 2011 WL 
2923860, at *4 (quoting Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 56 
(1st  Cir. 2009)).  Sylvester expressly rejected such an 
interpretation.  Observing that “[s]ome courts have 
misinterpreted [Platone‟s] analysis as a requirement that SOX 
complainants must allege elements of a securities fraud claim 
for protection,”  the ARB reasoned that “requiring a 
complainant to prove or approximate the specific elements of 
a securities law violation contradicts the statute‟s requirement 
that an employee have a reasonable belief of a violation of the 
enumerated statues.”  Sylvester, 2011 WL 2165854, at *18.  
The ARB further explained, “a complainant can engage in 
protected activity under Section 806 even if he or she fails to 
24 
 
allege or prove materiality, scienter, reliance, economic loss, 
or loss causation.”  Id.  We find this interpretation to be 
reasonable because there is nothing in the statutory text that 
suggests that a complainant‟s communications must assert the 
elements of fraud in order to express a reasonable belief that 
his or her employer is violating a provision listed in Section 
806.  Therefore, the District Court erred by requiring that an 
employee‟s communication reveal the elements of securities 
fraud, including intentional misrepresentation and materiality. 
 Second, the District Court concluded that to constitute 
protected activity, the information contained within an 
employee‟s communication must implicate “a reasonable 
belief of an existing violation.”  Wiest, 2011 WL 2923860, at 
*4 (emphasis added) (citing Livingston v. Wyeth, 520 F.3d 
344, 352 (4th Cir. 2008)).  Sylvester rejected this requirement 
as well.  The ARB held that Section 806 protects an 
employee‟s communication about a violation that has not yet 
occurred “as long as the employee reasonably believes that 
the violation is likely to happen.”  Sylvester, 2011 WL 
2165854, at *13.  We find this interpretation of the 
“reasonably believes” statutory phrase, 18 U.S.C. § 
1514A(a)(1), to be reasonable given the statute‟s purpose to 
combat corporate wrongdoing.  See S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 5 
(2002) (“Th[e] „corporate code of silence‟ not only hampers 
investigations, but also creates a climate where ongoing 
wrongdoing can occur with virtual impunity.”).  It would 
frustrate that purpose to require an employee, who knows that 
a violation is imminent, to wait for the actual violation to 
occur when an earlier report possibly could have prevented it. 
 Contrary to our dissenting colleague‟s assertion, we 
are not “ignor[ing] the need for a whistleblower‟s employer to 
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actually perceive that a whistle has been blown.”  (Dissenting 
Op. Typescript at 4.)  We agree with the Dissent that, in order 
for an employer to “know or suspect that the whistleblower-
plaintiff is engaged in protected conduct . . . the plaintiff‟s 
intra-corporate communications [must] relate in an 
understandable way to one of the stated provisions of federal 
law [in § 806].”  (Id.)  But the whistleblower‟s 
communication need not ring the bell on each element of one 
of the stated provisions of federal law to support an inference 
that the employer knew or suspected that the plaintiff was 
blowing the whistle on conduct that may fall within the ample 
reach of the anti-fraud laws listed in § 806.  To hold that an 
employer could not have suspected that the plaintiff was 
engaged in protected activity because the communication did 
not recite facts showing an objectively reasonable belief in 
the satisfaction of each element of one of the listed anti-fraud 
provisions would eviscerate § 806.  An employee may not 
have access to information necessary to form a judgment on 
certain elements of a generic fraud claim, such as scienter or 
materiality, and yet have knowledge of facts sufficient to alert 
the employer to fraudulent conduct.  When an employee 
communicates these facts to a supervisor, the employer has a 
sufficient basis to suspect that the employee is protected 
against reprisal for communicating that information. 
 Moreover, whether an employee‟s communication is 
indeed “protected activity” under § 806 is distinct from 
whether the employer had reason to suspect that the 
communication was protected.  To show that the 
communication is protected, the employee must have both a 
subjective and an objective belief that the conduct that is the 
subject of the communication relates to an existing or 
prospective violation of one of the federal laws referenced in 
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§ 806.  The communication itself need not reveal all the facts 
that would cause a reasonable person with the 
whistleblower‟s training and background to conclude that a 
referenced federal law has been or will be violated.  That 
determination should be based upon all the attendant 
circumstances, and not be limited to the facts conveyed by a 
whistleblower to the employer.  If the communication itself 
had to convey facts sufficient to support an objectively 
reasonable belief of a violation of one of the referenced laws, 
Congress would not have imposed liability upon an employer 
who merely “suspected” that the communication is protected 
from reprisal.   
In this case, the District Court did not decide this 
matter on the ground that Wiest‟s pleadings failed to support 
a plausible inference that Tyco knew or suspected that Wiest 
had engaged in protected activity.  Instead, the District Court 
decided that Wiest‟s Complaint was inadequate because the 
communications did not “definitively and specifically” relate 
to a statute or rule listed in § 806 and failed to articulate facts 
that supported a reasonable belief of actionable fraudulent 
conduct directed at investors.  Consistent with according 
Chevron deference to the ARB‟s holding in Sylvester, we 
have found that the standards used by the District Court were 
too stringent.  We now turn to Wiest‟s Complaint to ascertain 
whether it states a § 806 claim for relief under the standard 
announced in Sylvester.   
D. Application of Sylvester‟s Reasonable Belief Standard 
Although we hold that the District Court applied the 
wrong legal standard in analyzing Wiest‟s claims under 
Section 806, dismissal is still appropriate if Wiest 
nevertheless failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim.  
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See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“We may affirm the district court on any ground 
supported by the record.”).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, 
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 577 F.3d 521, 530 (3d Cir. 
2009) (alteration omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1. The Atlantis Resort Event 
The Complaint alleges that Wiest refused to process a 
payment for and questioned the legitimacy of an extravagant 
event to be held at the Atlantis Resort.  In particular, in a June 
3, 2008 email to his supervisor, Wiest explained, among other 
concerns, that “[a]s submitted, the costs are charged entirely 
to advertising expense which seems inappropriate and does 
not address the issue of breaking out the meals and 
entertainment portions which we feel would fall into the 50% 
deductibility classification for tax purposes.”  (App. 84, Ex. 
E.)  The Complaint also alleges that Wiest, like many others, 
was aware of a similar event held during Kozlowski‟s tenure.  
Wiest‟s email to his supervisor expressed his concerns about 
Tyco treating the costs of the event as business expenses and 
his belief that certain costs should be treated as income for the 
guests.  Because of his communication, a review of the 
expenses revealed that if Tyco had processed the transaction 
as originally submitted, it “would have resulted in a 
misstatement of accounting records and a fraudulent tax 
deduction . . . .”  (App. 43, ¶ 35.) 
These facts are sufficient to support a plausible 
inference that Wiest reasonably believed that Tyco‟s conduct 
would violate one of the provisions in Section 806 because he 
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foresaw a potentially fraudulent tax deduction and 
misstatement of accounting records if he did not bring that 
information to the attention of his supervisors.  Furthermore, 
Tyco‟s decision to “gross-up” its employees‟ income by 
compensating them for extra tax liabilities due to the Atlantis 
trip not being considered a business expense also plausibly 
created a reasonable belief in Wiest that a SOX violation 
would occur, given Wiest‟s familiarity with Kozlowski 
having used the “grossing-up” method during the Tyco 
scandal. 
We find that the alleged facts show not only that Wiest 
subjectively believed that Tyco‟s conduct may have violated 
a provision listed in Section 806, but also support an 
inference that his belief was objectively reasonable.  A 
reasonable person in Wiest‟s position who had seen the 
expense request for the extravagant Atlantis event could have 
believed that treating the Atlantis event as a business expense 
violated a provision of Section 806, especially given the 
scrutiny Tyco received during the Tyco International scandal 
under Kozlowski.  We find, therefore, that Wiest pled 
sufficient facts to establish that his communication relating to 
the Atlantis event was protected activity under Section 806.  
As a result, we reverse the District Court‟s dismissal Order 




                                              
5
 The Dissent asserts that the accounting treatment of 
the Atlantis event does not suggest fraudulent conduct, 
characterizing the manner in which the event‟s expenses were 
originally to be treated as an “error” or “mistake.”  
(Dissenting Op. Typescript at 16 n.12.)  That characterization 
29 
 
2. The Venetian Resort Event 
Wiest also alleges that he directed an expense request 
for an event at the Venetian Resort to be held while the tax 
department evaluated the business purpose of the event and 
until his department received proper documentation and 
accounting treatment.  After receiving a revised agenda, the 
tax department eventually approved the event as a business 
expense.  In an email chain attached to the Complaint relating 
to the Venetian event, the only reference to Wiest indicates 
that he asked his subordinate to forward a colleague 
additional information that Wiest‟s department had received 
about the event. That particular email also reveals that 
although the accounts payable department requested 
additional review of the expenses, the department “believe[d] 
the information provided substantiates this [event] as a 
business expense . . . .” (App. 114, Ex. M.) 
                                                                                                     
ignores the fact that we are dealing solely with the allegations 
of a complaint, which must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to Wiest.  See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (holding 
that, in the wake of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007), courts are still correct to “construe the complaint 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and [to] determine 
whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the 
plaintiff may be entitled to relief” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  In any event, the issue is not whether the 
contemplated accounting treatment was or was not part of a 
scheme to defraud.  The issue is whether such accounting 
treatment could reasonably be believed by Wiest to be 
fraudulent.  Given the Kozlowski scandal, a jury could find 
that Wiest reasonably believed that the sins of Kozlowski 
were being repeated. 
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Even if the facts in the Complaint established that 
Wiest subjectively believed the expense request for the 
Venetian event could have violated a provision in Section 
806, we conclude that, objectively, a reasonable person in 
Wiest‟s position would not have believed that the expense 
request that initially lacked a detailed agenda and breakdown 
of expenses would constitute a violation of one of the 
provisions listed in Section 806.  Therefore, we affirm the 
District‟s dismissal Order with respect to Wiest‟s 
communications relating to the Venetian event. 
3. The Wintergreen Resort Event 
Regarding the $355,000 event that took place at the 
Wintergreen Resort, Wiest alleges that the initial invoice 
lacked sufficient documentation and accounting breakdowns.  
In addition, Wiest alleges that a planned attendee of the event 
had approved the request instead of Defendant Thomas 
Lynch, the CEO, as required by Tyco‟s delegation of 
authority.  Emails relating to the event show that Wiest twice 
indicated to management that Lynch needed to approve the 
request.  In the first email, Wiest requested clarification from 
the CFO, Defendant Terrence Curtin, that he was approving 
the entire cost of the event and asked that Curtin copy Lynch 
on his response to communicate his approval.  After Curtin 
apparently responded by giving his approval without copying 
Lynch, Wiest then emailed his supervisor reiterating that he 
still believed that Lynch should be informed about the matter 
because Curtin could only approve up to $100,000 for events.  
Curtin failed to copy Lynch. 
The averments of the Complaint support an inference 
that Wiest subjectively believed that the lack of the CEO‟s 
approval, which contravened internal control procedures, 
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would violate one of the provisions enumerated in Section 
806.  Furthermore, it is plausible that a reasonable person in 
Wiest‟s position could have believed that the event‟s approval 
by an attendee of the event, who would therefore directly 
benefit from that approval, instead of by the CEO as required 
by internal control procedures, may have violated one of the 
provisions contained in Section 806.
6
  Therefore, we reverse 
the District Court‟s dismissal Order with respect to Wiest‟s 
communications relating to the Wintergreen event. 
4. Other Matters 
Wiest emailed management in 2007 about an 
employee who submitted improper expenses to inform 
management that if it wished to claim the expenses as 
business expenses then either Tyco would have to be 
reimbursed or the charges would have to be reported as 
income for the employee.  The allegation and corresponding 
                                              
6
 The Dissent questions whether unauthorized 
expenditures for the Wintergreen Resort event could support 
a claim under one of the anti-fraud laws listed in § 806.  
Approval authorities exist to ensure that large expenditures 
are undertaken for appropriate business purposes.  
Expenditures for which required approvals have not been 
obtained raise the specter that they are not undertaken for an 
appropriate business purpose.  Once again, such expenditures 
could plunder corporate assets for the benefit of those 
attending lavish events, masking personal income.  We 
believe that the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to plausibly 
support an inference that Wiest had an objectively reasonable 
belief that the absence of the CEO‟s authorization for the 
Wintergreen Resort Event was part of a fraudulent scheme. 
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email show only that Wiest explained to management the 
potential tax consequences relating to the expenses.  Without 
more, the Complaint lacks sufficient facts to establish that 
Wiest reasonably believed that Tyco‟s handling of the matter 
constituted a violation of a law listed in Section 806. 
In addition, Wiest alleges that he “raised questions” 
about proper accounting treatment of other events that 
occurred between late 2007 and September 2009, including a 
“lavish” holiday party, a team meeting that did not break out 
entertainment and meal expenses, and a baby shower for an 
employee.  Aside from stating that it took several attempts to 
confirm that the baby shower would be treated as a business 
expense, Wiest fails to allege any facts suggesting that he 
reasonably believed these events violated an enumerated 
provision in Section 806.  The Complaint does not specify 
anything about the nature or content of his communications.  
By itself, the allegation that Wiest “raised questions” does not 
create a plausible inference that he or any reasonable person 
in his position would believe that expenditures on the events 
rose to the level of a violation of a provision in Section 806.  
As a result, we affirm the District Court‟s dismissal Order 
with respect to Wiest‟s communications relating to the 
improper business expense claims of an individual employee 
as well as the holiday party, team meeting, and baby shower 
events. 
III. 
In sum, we hold that the reasonable belief test is the 
appropriate standard with which to analyze the 
communications that Wiest contends constitute “protected 
activity.”  As explained in Sylvester, that standard requires 
that an employee‟s communication reflect a subjective and 
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objectively reasonable belief that his employer‟s conduct 
constitutes a violation of an enumerated provision in Section 
806.  The District Court erred in dismissing Wiest‟s 
Complaint by employing the “definitive and specific” 
standard, by interpreting Section 806 to require that an 
employee‟s alleged “protected activity” reveal the elements of 
securities fraud, and by requiring that his or her 
communication reference an existing violation.  We find that 
Wiest has pled adequate facts to show that his 
communications relating to the Atlantis and Wintergreen 
events were protected activity under Section 806.  We agree 
with the District Court, however, that Wiest cannot establish 
that his communications relating to the other alleged matters 
constituted protected activity. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District 
Court‟s Order denying Wiest‟s Motion for Reconsideration.  
See McDowell v. Phila. Housing Auth., 423 F.3d 233, 238 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (explaining that an errant conclusion of law may 
result in an abuse of discretion).  We also reverse the District 
Court‟s Order granting Tyco‟s Motion to Dismiss as to 
Wiest‟s communications relating to the Atlantis and 
Wintergreen events and affirm the dismissal as to Wiest‟s 
communications relating to the other events.
7
  We remand 
this matter to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
7
 In light of the reinstatement of the SOX Section 806 
claims, the District Court‟s decision to decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction will be vacated.  
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Wiest, et al. v. Lynch, et al., No. 11-4257  
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Dissenting 
 
 Because I believe the District Court properly 
determined that the Wiests failed to establish that Mr. Wiest 
held or communicated an objectively reasonable belief that 
the actions of Tyco officials constituted a violation of one or 
more of the laws referenced in § 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (“SOX”), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A), I respectfully dissent. 
 
Whistleblower statutes like SOX § 806 seek to protect 
people who have the courage to stand against institutional 
pressures and say plainly, “what you are doing here is wrong” 
– not wrong in some abstract or philosophical way, but wrong 
in the particular way indentified in the statute at issue.  See 
Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(requiring that an employee‟s Section 806 complaint “be 
measured against the basic elements of the laws specified in 
the statute”).  The protection of § 806 depends upon the 
whistleblower identifying wrongdoing made illegal by federal 
laws targeting fraud, especially fraud against the holders of 
publicly traded securities.  To qualify as a whistleblower 
under § 806, the employee must have provided information 
regarding conduct “which the employee reasonably believes 
constitutes a violation of [18 U.S.C. §§] 1341 [mail fraud], 
1343 [wire fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities 
fraud], any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud 
against shareholders … .”  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).  Section 
806 thus defines protected conduct not by reference to the 
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statute in which it is contained,
1
 but by reference to four 
federal fraud statutes, SEC rules and regulations, and other 
federal law that is circumscribed as “relating to fraud against 
shareholders.”   
 
As the Majority notes, the elements of a § 806 
retaliation claim are that (1) the employee “engaged in a 
protected activity,” (2) the employer “knew or suspected that 
the employee engaged in the protected activity,” (3) the 
employee “suffered an adverse action,” and (4) the 
circumstances were “sufficient to raise the inference that the 
                                              
1
 In contrast to § 806, other whistleblower statutes 
often identify the targeted wrongdoing within the same 
statutory scheme.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a)(1) (defining 
protected conduct pursuant to the Clean Air Act as having 
“commenced, caused to be commenced, or [to be] about to 
commence ... a proceeding” under the Act or testifying or 
assisting in such a proceeding); 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1) 
(defining protected conduct pursuant to the Energy 
Reorganization Act as having notified an employer of a 
violation of the Act, refusing to engage in practices prohibited 
by the Act, or commencing or testifying in a proceeding 
regarding violations of the Act); 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) 
(defining protected conduct pursuant to the Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Act as having “filed or made a complaint 
under or related to” the Act); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (defining 
protected conduct  pursuant to the National Labor Relations 
Act as having “filed charges or given testimony” under the 
Act); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) (defining protected conduct 
under the False Claims Act as “lawful acts done by the 
employee[] ... in furtherance of an action under [the Act] or 
other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of [the Act]”). 
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protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse 
action.”  29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e)(2); see also Day, 555 F.3d 
at 53 (noting that the “requirements for a prima facie [§ 806] 
case are articulated in the DOL regulations” (citing 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1980.104)).  For purposes of the first, second, and fourth 
elements, the term “protected activity” means “to provide 
information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise 
assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the 
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of” one 
of the laws referenced in § 806.  11 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).  
To establish a reasonable belief that such a violation has 
taken place, “an employee must show that he had both a 
subjective belief and an objectively reasonable belief that the 
conduct he complained of constituted a violation of relevant 
law.”  Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, general allegations 
of misconduct by corporate officers, even if that misconduct 
relates to financial matters, are not sufficient to state a § 806 
claim.  See Day, 555 F.3d at 56-57 (noting that “violations of 
„general accounting principles‟” do not constitute 
“shareholder fraud” that gives rise to SOX-protected activity).   
 
The second element of a SOX retaliation claim 
confirms that conclusion.  It is difficult to see how a 
defendant, such as a whistleblower‟s supervisor, can know or 
suspect that the whistleblower-plaintiff is engaged in 
protected conduct if the plaintiff‟s intra-corporate 
communications do not relate in an understandable way to 
one of the stated provisions of federal law.  What matters is 
not what is locked inside the plaintiff‟s mind or how the 
plaintiff may later describe his actions; it is what is 
communicated to the employer that counts.  See Welch, 536 
F.3d at 277 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is what an employee 
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actually communicated to [his] employer prior to the ... 
termination; it is not what [is] alleged in [the employee‟s] 
OSHA complaint.”  (alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   Both the Department of Labor‟s 
Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) and the Majority 
effectively bypass that element of a SOX retaliation claim and 
concentrate their focus on the complainant‟s frame of mind 
and after-the-fact spin.  In doing so, they ignore the need for a 





The imperative that the whistleblower sound off with 
clarity was the subject of the ARB‟s opinion in Platone v. 
FLYi, Inc., 25 IER Cases 278 (Sept. 29, 2006).  That opinion, 
the reasoning of which was adopted by several courts of 
appeals,
3
 required that “the [complaining] employee‟s 
                                              
2
 The Majority contends that “whether an employee‟s 
communication is indeed „protected activity‟ under § 806 is 
distinct from whether the employer had reason to suspect that 
the communication was protected.”  (Majority Op. at 25.)  
That, however, is contradicted by what the Majority 
acknowledges is the second element of a § 806 claim, namely 
that the employer “knew or suspected that the employee 
engaged in the protected activity.”  (Id. at 15 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).)  The communication of a 
suspected fraud is the protected activity.   
3
 See, e.g., Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 
989, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2009) (deferring to the ARB‟s 
determination that an “employee‟s communications must 
„definitively and specifically‟ relate to [one] of the listed 
categories of fraud or securities violations under [§ 1514A]”);  
Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The 
 5 
 
communications must „definitively and specifically‟ relate to 
any of the listed categories of fraud or securities violations 
under [§ 806].”  25 IER Cases at 287.  In essence, the ARB 
established something like a pleading standard for intra-
corporate communications.  But Platone has been supplanted 
by the ARB‟s recent opinion in Sylvester v. Parexel 
International LLC, 32 IER Cases 497, 505 (U.S. Dep‟t of 
Labor May. 25, 2011) (en banc), which jettisons the 
requirement that SOX whistleblowers definitively and 
specifically tie with their disclosures to the kinds of fraud 
listed in § 806.     
 
The ARB evidently viewed that standard as too 
stringent.  When confronted in Sylvester with complainants 
who alleged that their intra-corporate communications 
concerning compliance with FDA testing protocols were 
actually allegations of securities fraud,
4
 the ARB in effect 
said “good enough.”  More precisely, it said:  
                                                                                                     
employee must show that his communications to the 
employer specifically related to one of the laws listed in 
§ 1514A.”); Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 2008)  
(“[A]n employee must show that his communications to his 
employer definitively and specifically relate[d] to one of the 
laws listed in § 1514A.” (internal alteration and quotation 
marks omitted));  Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 
476 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We agree with the ARB‟s legal 
conclusion that an employee‟s complaint must definitively 
and specifically relate to one of the six enumerated categories 
found in § 1514A.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
4
 The rather tenuous connection between the 
company‟s conduct and “fraud against shareholders” that the 
Sylvester employees asserted was that, “by covering up 
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[b]ecause a complainant need not prove a 
violation of the substantive laws, … a [SOX] 
complainant can have an objectively 
reasonable belief of a violation of the laws in 
Section 806 … even if the complainant fails 
to allege, prove, or approximate specific 
elements of fraud, which would be required 
under a fraud claim against the defrauder 
directly.  In other words, a complainant can 
engage in protected activity under Section 
806 even if he or she fails to allege or prove 
materiality, scienter, reliance, economic loss, 
or loss causation. 
 
Sylvester, 32 IER Cases at 512 (emphasis added).  Ponder 
that: without “alleg[ing]” or “prov[ing]” or even 
“approximat[ing]” a charge of fraud, the complaints of a so-
called whistleblower are, in the ARB‟s view, supposed to put 
a company on notice that a fraud has been identified.  The 
rationale the ARB offered for that conclusion was the ipse 
dixit that “the purposes of the whistleblower protection 
provision will be thwarted,” id. at 512, if a § 806 complainant 
proceeding on a theory of underlying shareholder fraud must 
actually say something pointing out such fraud.   
                                                                                                     
clinical research fraud … Parexel engaged in fraud against its 
shareholders, financial institutions, and others” because 
disclosure of the compliance failures would have been “at the 
expense of the long-term financial performance of the 
company … [and] would have significantly reduced Parexel‟s 
revenue and reputation.”  Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC, 32 




To discredit the “definitive and specific” requirement, 
the ARB said that the requirement had been erroneously 
drawn from a different statute.  The whistleblowing provision 
in the Energy Reorganization Act (“ERA”), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5851, protects an employee who participates in any 
“proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes” 
of that statute.  42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1)(F).  The ARB 
reasoned that the “importation” of a pleading standard 
derived from the ERA‟s catch-all provision “is inapposite to 
the question of what constitutes protected activity under 
SOX‟s whistleblower protection provision” because “the 
SOX whistleblower protection provision contains no similar 
language, and instead expressly identifies the several laws to 
which it applies.”  32 IER Cases at 509.   
 
My colleagues in the Majority conclude that “the 
ARB‟s rejection of Platone‟s „definitive and specific‟ 
standard is entitled to Chevron deference” (Majority Op. at 
18) because “the ARB thoroughly explained why it reversed 
the course it previously set in Platone” (id. at 20).  With all 
due respect, I cannot agree with that generous 
characterization of the ARB‟s work product.  Sylvester’s 
rejection of Platone is hardly explained and far from 
persuasive.
5
  It is strange, for example, to hear the ARB claim 
                                              
5
 Chevron deference extends only to reasonable agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory language.  See 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous …, 
the question for the court is whether the agency‟s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).  For 
several reasons, including those discussed herein, I question 
whether the ARB‟s interpretation of the requirements of a 
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that the greater specificity of § 806 makes the “definitive and 
specific” standard inappropriate but then hear it say in the 
next breath that one need not bother with alleging, proving, or 
even approximating a statement showing that the specifics of 
§ 806 have been satisfied. 
 
Moreover, the reasoning behind the “definitive and 
specific”  standard applies with at least equal force to § 806 
as it does to the pertinent provision of the ERA.  I agree with 
the ARB at least to the extent that it observed that courts have 
construed the ERA catch-all provision “in light of [that 
statute‟s] overarching purpose of protecting acts implicating 
nuclear safety,” and thus courts have required “that an 
employee‟s actions implicate safety „definitively and 
specifically‟” to constitute protected activity.  Sylvester, 32 
IER Cases at 509.  In the same way, the overarching purpose 
of SOX is to expose and therefore deter fraud against 
shareholders of companies whose shares are publicly traded, 
see Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting 
that “[SOX] ... outlaws fraud and deception by managers in 
the auditing process” (quoting S. Rep. No. 107-205, at 23 
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)), and, just as the 
ERA cases call for a definitive and specific linkage to that 
statute‟s purpose, so a SOX whistleblower was, once upon a 
time, required to demonstrate “definitively and specifically” 
that the subject of his allegedly protected communication 
implicated the kind of unlawful activity targeted by SOX.
6
 
                                                                                                     
§ 806 claim, as expressed in Sylvester, represents a reasonable 
and thus permissible construction of the statute. 
6
 As the ARB sees it, the “plain language” of § 806 
somehow demands a different result from the one it 
previously insisted on in Platone.  See Sylvester, 32 IER 
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At the end of the day, though, the fate of the 
“definitive and specific” standard is not the main issue.  That 
standard is just one way of practically addressing the 
requirement that a SOX whistleblower demonstrate a 
reasonable belief that the kinds of unlawful behavior 
identified in § 806 have occurred or are threatened.  Of 
particular importance here is the “objective reasonableness” 
component of the reasonable belief requirement.  The ARB 
reaffirmed that component in Sylvester, noting that “[t]he 
second element of the „reasonable belief‟ standard, the 
objective component, „is evaluated based on the knowledge 
available to a reasonable person in the same factual 
circumstances with the same training and experience as the 
aggrieved employee.‟”  32 IER Cases at 507 (quoting Harp v. 
Charter Commc’ns Inc., 558 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2009)).7  
                                                                                                     
Cases at 508 (saying that “the ALJ failed to focus on the plain 
language of the SOX whistleblower protection provision”).  
Quoting not the statute, but its legislative history, the ARB 
says that § 806 protects “„all good faith and reasonable 
reporting of fraud.‟”  See id. (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S7418-
01, S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002)).  That broad statement 
does not support the standardless liability imposed by 
Sylvester, but, more to the point, we are not trying to apply 
legislative history.  Our job is to interpret and apply the 
statute itself.  The plain language of § 806 protects only 
reporting of conduct that an employee “reasonably believes” 
constitutes a violation of one of four specific fraud provisions 
set forth in federal criminal law, or certain SEC rules and 
regulations, or, at the catch-all level, any other provision of 
federal law that targets “fraud against shareholders.”  18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).     
7
 Moreover, prior to Sylvester, our sister circuits treated 
 10 
 
Unfortunately, Sylvester provides no guidance as to what, if 
anything, a § 806 claimant is required to allege.  In its efforts 
to lower the bar, the ARB has provided little more than a 
recitation of what is not required for an employee to allege 
protected conduct.  See 32 IER Cases at 512 (“[A] 
complainant need not prove a violation of the substantive 
laws …”); id. (“[A] complainant can engage in protected 
activity under Section 806 even if he or she fails to allege or 
prove materiality, scienter, reliance, economic loss, or loss 
causation.”); id. ([A] complainant ... [need not] allege, prove, 
                                                                                                     
the “definitive and specific” requirement as separate from the 
statutory requirement of reasonable belief.  See, e.g., Welch, 
536 F.3d at 275 (“To … establish that he engaged in 
protected activity, an employee must show that he had both „a 
subjective belief and an objectively reasonable belief‟ that the 
conduct he complained of constituted a violation of relevant 
law.  Additionally, an employee must show that his 
communications to his employer „definitively and specifically 
relate[d]‟ to one of the laws listed in § 1514A.”); Van Asdale 
v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(noting, after determining that the plaintiffs satisfied the 
“definitively and specifically” standard from Platone, that 
they must also have a reasonable belief concerning a violation 
of a listed law in order “to trigger the protections of the Act”); 
Day, 555 F.3d at 54 (treating the “definitively and 
specifically” requirement and “reasonable belief” requirement 
separately); Allen, 514 F.3d at 477 (same).  Consequently, 
although the ARB eliminated the “definitive and specific” 
standard as “an inappropriate test ... [that] is often applied too 
strictly,” 32 IER Cases at 509, the determination of the 
objective reasonableness of a SOX complainant‟s belief 
remains a necessity. 
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or approximate that the reported irregularity or misstatement 
satisfies securities law „materiality‟ standards, was done 
intentionally, was relied upon by shareholders, and that 
shareholders suffered a loss because of the irregularity.”).8 
 
Trying to apply the impossibly vague “standard” of 
Sylvester, the Majority has adopted an internally inconsistent 
test.  On one hand, my colleagues rightly reject the argument 
offered by our amicus, the National Whistleblower Center, 
that no more than an employee‟s own subjective good faith 
belief is required to allege a § 806 violation.  (See Majority 
Op. at 21 (“As explained in Sylvester, the reasonable belief 
standard also includes an objective element.”).)  On the other 
hand, they go on to conclude that the ARB “expressly 
rejected” the District Court‟s interpretation of § 806 as 
requiring that Wiest demonstrate “„an objectively reasonable 
belief that the company intentionally misrepresented or 
omitted certain facts to investors which were material and 
which risked loss.‟” (Majority Op. at 23 (quoting Wiest v. 
Lynch, No. 10-3288, 2011 WL 2923860, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 
21, 2011)).)  Those two conclusions seem to me to be in 
tension, and one is left to wonder what the objective standard 
is for measuring whether a complainant‟s belief is reasonable 
if it is not the existing rules of law expressly noted in § 806.
9
   
                                              
8
 The Majority follows the ARB‟s approach, 
concluding that a “whistleblower‟s communication need not 
ring the bell on each element of one of the stated provisions 
of federal law in [§ 806]” (Majority Op. at 25), without 
specifying which, if any, bells must be rung.   
9
 The Majority perceives no inconsistency because it 
“do[es] not think Congress intended such a formalistic 
approach to the question of whether an employee has engaged 
 12 
 
Pre-Sylvester case law from federal courts made it 
clear that “[t]he reasonableness of [a SOX complainant‟s] 
belief for purposes of § [806] must be measured against the 
basic elements of the laws specified in the statute.”  Day, 555 
F.3d at 55.  Logically, that ought still to be the case.  Section 
806 references identifiable pieces of positive law.  They are 
not mere generalities and they do not open the door to 
whistleblower relief to anyone with vague feelings of unease 
or even specific discomfort with something other than that 
which is identified in § 806.  Particularly pertinent here, 
“„[f]raud‟ itself has defined legal meanings and is not, in the 
context of SOX, a colloquial term.”  Id.10  Section 806 thus 
                                                                                                     
in „protected activity.‟”  (Majority Op. at 22.)   I do not agree 
that requiring that an allegedly protected communication 
clearly relate to one of the laws enumerated in § 806 is an 
exercise in formalism.  But even if it were, Congress has 
expressed its intent in the text of the statute, which sets forth 
the particular laws that may give rise to a SOX whistleblower 
claim. 
10
 The Majority correctly points out that an employee‟s 
reasonable belief may not always be determined as a matter 
of law or on the basis of averments in a complaint.  However, 
a SOX whistleblower‟s claim must be based on allegations of 
mail, wire, and securities fraud, which are required to be pled 
with specificity pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b) or are subject to the heightened pleading standards of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).  Rule 9(b) “gives 
defendants notice of the claims against them, provides an 
increased measure of protection for their reputations, and 
reduces the number of frivolous suits,” In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997), while 
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requires a SOX whistleblower to demonstrate that he has 
done more than criticize undesirable corporate conduct.  He is 
required to demonstrate that his protected communication 
concerned a “violation” of one of the listed statutes or of an 
SEC rule or regulation or other Federal law relating to fraud 
on shareholders.  A violation can only be said to “relat[e] to 
... fraud against shareholders” if it manifests at least some of 
the elements of fraud as defined in the securities context, such 
as falsity, scienter, and materiality.  Cf. In re Cabletron Sys., 
Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 34 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Merely stating in 
conclusory fashion that a company‟s books are out of 
compliance with GAAP would not in itself demonstrate 
                                                                                                     
the PSLRA is intended to “curb frivolous lawyer-driven 
litigation, while preserving the [plaintiffs‟] ability to recover 
on meritorious claims,” Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 
F.3d 319, 326 (3d Cir. 2007).  Notwithstanding the ARB‟s 
conclusion that those sorts of heightened pleading 
requirements “should not be applied to SOX whistleblower 
claims,” Sylvester, 32 IER Cases at 505, the same concerns 
that gave rise to those requirements suggest that 
communications that serve as the basis of a claim under § 806 
should contain something more than vague allegations 
concerning a possible fraud.  I am not suggesting the 
importation of pleading standards to the review of a 
whistleblower‟s allegedly protected communications.  I am 
suggesting that it is not too much to ask for some specificity, 
especially since SOX whistleblower protection has the effect 
of shielding an employee from any disciplinary action and 





liability under section 10(b) or Rule 10b–5.”); DSAM Global 
Value Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 390 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (“[T]he mere publication of inaccurate accounting 
figures, or a failure to follow GAAP, without more, does not 
establish scienter” in a securities fraud action (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 
309 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A]llegations of GAAP violations or 
accounting irregularities, standing alone, are insufficient to 
state a securities fraud claim.  Only where such allegations 
are coupled with evidence of „corresponding fraudulent 
intent,‟ might they be sufficient.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The many cases to that effect cannot with 
propriety be swept away by the federal bureaucracy deciding 




                                              
11
 We are not required to follow – and arguably are 
constitutionally compelled to reject – an agency‟s reversal of 
course that contradicts prior judicial interpretations of a 
statute.  “Article III courts do not sit to render decisions that 
can be reversed or ignored by executive officers.”  Nat’l 
Cable & Telecommc’ns Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 1017 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Chicago 
& S. Air Lines Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 
(1948)).  “Once [a court] ha[s] determined a statute‟s 
meaning, [it] adhere[s] to [its] ruling under the doctrine of 
stare decisis, and [it] assess[es] an agency‟s later 
interpretation of the statute against that settled law.”  Neal v. 
United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996).  In this case, 
numerous courts of appeals, see supra note 3, have construed 
SOX § 806 as requiring that a complainant‟s communications 
include the elements of one or more of the referenced laws.  
Under the Majority‟s approach, the ARB will be “able to 
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In this case, the application of a test of objective 
reasonableness that looks to the elements of securities fraud 
shows Wiest‟s allegedly protected communications for what 
they are: a bookkeeper‟s sensible inquiries about proper 
accounting for expenses, not allegations of fraud.  Wiest‟s 
statements about the Atlantis Resort Event prove the point.  
The Majority concludes that “[a] reasonable person in Wiest‟s 
position who had seen the expense request for the extravagant 
Atlantis event could have believed that treating the Atlantis 
event as a business expense may have violated a provision of 
Section 806 … .”  (Majority Op. at 28.)  A fair question is 
“which one?”  Wiest does not claim that he reasonably 
believed that “extravagance” or the possible reporting of 
employee expenses as advertising expenses constituted mail 
fraud, wire fraud, or bank fraud.  He alleges rather that, “if 
Tyco had processed the transaction as originally submitted, it 
„would have resulted in a misstatement of accounting records 
and a fraudulent tax deduction.‟”  (Majority Op. at 27 
(quoting App. at 43).)  That would seem to point to a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1348, which involves fraud in 
connection with a sale of securities, or of a “rule or regulation 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision 
of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.” 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).  However, Wiest‟s communication 
with Tyco about the Atlantis Event contains none of the 
elements of a securities fraud.  In particular, it contains no 
                                                                                                     
disregard that construction and seek Chevron deference for its 
contrary construction the next time around.”  Nat’l Cable & 
Telecommc’ns Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Stare decisis is not a straitjacket, but it must mean something 
more than “this is the law until the executive branch 
unilaterally changes its mind.” 
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hint of falsity but rather suggests that an accounting judgment 
was faulty and needed to be corrected, which it was.
12
   
                                              
12
 My colleagues in the Majority appear to have been 
persuaded by an allegation in Wiest‟s complaint that, but for 
his intervention, the Atlantis Event would have resulted in “a 
misstatement of accounting records and a fraudulent tax 
deduction.”  (Majority Op. at 5 (quoting App. at 43-44) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).)  Following the Majority‟s 
instruction that the determination of reasonable belief “should 
be based upon all of the attendant circumstances, and not be 
limited to the facts conveyed by a whistleblower to the 
employer” (id. at 26), Wiest‟s Atlantis Event allegation is 
belied by the record and is inconsistent with applicable tax 
law.  Wiest‟s email regarding the Atlantis Event simply 
requested that “the relevant tax department resources” review 
the proposed costs to determine if some would not have been 
fully deductible as business expenses but rather would have to 
be treated as employee compensation and reported as income 
to employees attending.  (See App. at 102 (suggesting that the 
“meal and entertainment portions” might “fall into the 50% 
deductibility classification for tax purposes” and that 
expenses associated with spouses and friends attending the 
event should be “recorded as income to the employees 
attending”).)  As Wiest himself admits in his complaint, the 
result of that review was that Tyco determined that “[t]he trip 
did not qualify as a business expense per IRS guidelines and[] 
... would have to be treated as an award and as income to the 
attendees and reported on their W-2s.”  (App. at 45.)  
Compensation to employees is treated as a business expense 
for federal tax purposes, see I.R.C. § 162(a)(1), so the cost 
would have been deductible for Tyco under either scenario.  
The classification of the cost of the Atlantis Event, while 
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 The supposed connection between Wiest‟s 
communications regarding the Wintergreen Resort Event and 
a violation of a statute or regulation referenced in § 806 is 
even more strained.  The Majority concludes that “a 
reasonable person in Wiest‟s position could have believed 
that the event‟s approval by an attendee of the event[] … 
instead of by the CEO as required by internal control 
procedures, may have violated one of the provisions 
contained in Section 806.” (Majority Op. at 31.)  Assuming 
the unspecified violation is again securities fraud, there is still 
the glaring question of how his communication with the 
company indicated any fraud.  Unlike his allegations 
concerning the Atlantis Resort Event, Wiest does not claim 
that expenses from that event were not recorded correctly, nor 
does he allege that any public financial disclosure was at 
issue.  As a result, it is impossible to identify a securities 
fraud.  The Majority simply suggests that it was reasonable 
for Wiest to believe that there had been such a violation 
because “the event‟s approval [was] by an attendee of the 
event, who would therefore directly benefit from that 
approval … .” (Id.)  Leaving aside the fact that there is no 
explanation of what the “direct benefit” was, that allegation 
goes only to motivation and does nothing to establish a 
violation of any of the laws referenced in § 806. 
 
Given the present record, two final observations 
should be made about the Majority‟s application of the 
                                                                                                     
significant to employees for whom it represented taxable 
compensation, was irrelevant for purposes of Tyco‟s public 
financial statements, and, even if the error had gone 
uncorrected, it is a huge stretch to say that such a mistake 
would constitute shareholder fraud. 
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objective reasonableness standard.  First, even Sylvester 
acknowledged that objective reasonableness “is evaluated 
based on the knowledge available to a reasonable person in 
the same factual circumstances with the same training and 
experience as the aggrieved employee.”  32 IER Cases at 507 
(quoting Harp, 558 F.3d at 723) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  When an employee is a licensed CPA, and thus 
able to distinguish between violations of accounting rules and 
violations of SEC rules or regulations, a failure to do so tends 
to show his asserted belief that a violation of the latter has 
occurred to be less than objectively reasonable.  Cf. Allen, 
514 F.3d at 477 (finding that, although a violation of an SEC 
accounting bulletin could fall within the general “fraud 
against shareholder” category of § 1514A, the complainant 
CPA‟s belief as to the violation was not objectively 
reasonable).  Wiest is a trained accountant who had more than 
thirty years experience in Tyco‟s accounting department, 
which, as the Majority points out, had been under “a high 
level of audit scrutiny” for the last decade.  (Majority Op. at 
4. (quoting App. at 42) (internal quotation marks omitted).)  
The Majority itself observes that Wiest had knowledge of 
both “accounting standards ... and securities and tax laws.”  
(Id.) Therefore, Wiest should be held to a “higher [objective 
reasonableness] standard” than someone of “limited 
education.”  Sylvester, 32 IER Cases at 507 (citing Parexel 
Int’l Corp. v. Feliciano, 28 IER Cases 820, 2008 WL 
5101642, at *3 & n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2008)).  Since his allegedly 
protected communications do not meet even an objective 
standard geared to the general public, they certainly do not 
meet a heightened standard applicable to someone of his 




Second, as the ARB acknowledged in Sylvester, “many 
of the laws listed in § [806] of SOX contain materiality 
requirements,” and “[i]t may well be that a complainant‟s 
complaint concerns such a trivial matter that he or she did not 
engage in protected activity under Section 806.”  32 IER 
Cases at 512.  For that grudging acknowledgement of a 
materiality requirement to be consistent with existing law 
concerning fraud against shareholders, a SOX complainant 
must believe that there is “a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by 
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
„total mix‟ of information made available.”  Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 
448 (acknowledging that certain information concerning 
corporate developments is of “dubious significance”).  
Wiest‟s allegedly protected communications concerned 
transactions with no financial impact on Tyco, see supra note 
12, or internal control practices that are not financial in nature 
and are not reported to shareholders.  The subjects of Wiest‟s 
communications were not material, and contrary to the 
Majority‟s conclusion, those communications do not 
demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that a 
shareholder fraud was being threatened. 
 
The essence of Wiest‟s assertion that the conduct he 
found objectionable “relates to” fraud against shareholders for 
purposes of § 806 is, as his attorney put it to the District 
Court, that “every time you improperly allocate money to 
something that is improper, you are affecting the value of the 
company, and the value of the company is determined by 
individuals who buy and sell stock.”  (App. at 290-91.)  That 
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sweeping statement, which even the attorney attempted to 
walk back at oral argument before us, underscores the flaw in 
the Majority‟s approach to post-Sylvester objective 
reasonableness.  If it is unnecessary to measure a SOX 
complainant‟s reasonable belief against at least some of the 
elements of securities fraud, like materiality, then virtually 
any internal questioning of an accounting mistake or a 
judgment call turns the questioner into a SOX whistleblower, 
and that cannot be right.   
 
As the District Court correctly noted, Wiest “failed … 
to plead facts reflecting [his] reasonable belief that his 
communications regarding the tax treatment of certain 
company expenses related – in any way, definitively and 
specifically, or otherwise – to shareholder fraud or a violation 
of one of the statutes or rules listed in § [806].”  Wiest v. 
Lynch, No. 10-3288, 2011 WL 5572608, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 
16, 2011).  The District Court recognized that the protection 
afforded SOX whistleblowers is limited to communications 
that relate to violations of the law specified in § 806, and it 
assessed the reasonableness of Wiest‟s alleged belief 
consistent with the explicit scope of § 806.  The thoughtful 
opinion of the District Court is entirely sound in that regard, 
and I would therefore affirm the judgment against the 
Appellants.  
